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Introduction 
This paper examines the law relating to the right of communication to the public with 
reference to cloud storage and retrieval. It does so under the WIPO Internet treaties and EU 
statutory and case law, with some references to Member State statutory and case law when 
relevant. It focuses therefore on the liability of the cloud computing provider and the user for 
communication to the public, which, according to the law, includes making protected content 
available to the public. I leave aside the private international law issues as they are addressed 
by other speakers.  
I. The legal framework 
 
A. Statutory law 
This section details the relevant provisions which may apply in a scenario where the cloud 
computing provider and/or the user communicate copyright-protected content to the public. 
The two WIPO Internet Treaties of 1996 provide for a right of communication to the public 
which includes a right of making works and other protected subject-matter available. 
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Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty - Right of Communication to the Public 
³Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 11ter(1)(ii), 
14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and artistic works shall 
enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by 
wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a 
way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.´ 
The WPPT provides the same right for performers and producers of phonogram producers 
(art. 10 and 14 WPPT). 
This text is reproduced DOPRVW ZRUG IRU ZRUG LQ DUWLFOH  RI WKH (8¶V ,QIR6RF Directive1 
which implements the WCT and WPPT and it also gives the right to producers of first 
fixations of films and broadcasting organisations. 
Communication to the public means communication to the public to an audience which is not 
present at the place of origin.2 In the case of cloud computing, this is always the case: the 
provider, the users and the public are all in different locations. I exclude cloud computing 
which is done internally by an organisation and which only uses the facilities for its internal 
purSRVHVVRQHYHUFRPPXQLFDWHVDQ\WKLQJRXWVLGHLWVµZDOOV¶SHUVRQQHO This is because this 
type of communication does not involve any public and also because the most common type 
of cloud computing nowadays is by definition outside the control of the user. 
As to enforcement, article 8(3) InfoSoc Directive provides WKDW³Member States shall ensure 
that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose 
services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right´This allows right 
holders to sue the cloud computing provider and require the court to order him to stop the 
third party infringement.  
As cloud computing providers host content, articles 14 and 15 of the E-Commerce Directive 
(ECD)3 are also relevant as they establish safe harbours for hosting and prohibit Member 
States from obliging hosts to monitor content generally.  
³$UWLFOH- Hosting 
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of 
information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the 
service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the 
service, on condition that: 
                                                          
* Professor of Intellectual Property Law, University of Nottingham. Unless otherwise stated, the quotations 
from the literature are cited without the footnotes. 
1
 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167, 22/06/2001, p. 10-19 
(further referred to as InfoSoc Directive). 
2
 See e.g. S. von Lewinski, International Copyright Law and Policy, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 148, no. 
5.138 and CJEU case law, see below. 
3
 Directive 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, 
in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1. 
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(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as 
regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal 
activity or information is apparent; or 
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove 
or to disable access to the information. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority 
or the control of the provider. 
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in 
accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate 
or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of 
establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information. 
Article 15 - No general obligation to monitor 
1. Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the 
services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or 
store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal 
activity. 
2. Member States may establish obligations for information society service providers 
promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or 
information provided by recipients of their service or obligations to communicate to the 
competent authorities, at their request, information enabling the identification of recipients of 
their service with whom they have storage agreements.´ 
Recitals 42, 43, 44, 47 and 48 ECD are also relevant.  
³(42) The exemptions from liability established in this Directive cover only cases where the 
activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process of 
operating and giving access to a communication network over which information made 
available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored, for the sole purpose of making 
the transmission more efficient; this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive 
nature, which implies that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of 
nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored. 
(43) A service provider can benefit from the exemptions for "mere conduit" and for "caching" 
when he is in no way involved with the information transmitted; this requires among other 
things that he does not modify the information that he transmits; this requirement does not 
cover manipulations of a technical nature which take place in the course of the transmission 
as they do not alter the integrity of the information contained in the transmission. 
(44) A service provider who deliberately collaborates with one of the recipients of his service 
in order to undertake illegal acts goes beyond the activities of "mere conduit" or "caching" 
and as a result cannot benefit from the liability exemptions established for these activities.  
(47) Member States are prevented from imposing a monitoring obligation on service 
providers only with respect to obligations of a general nature; this does not concern 
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monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect orders by national 
authorities in accordance with national legislation. 
(48) This Directive does not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service 
providers, who host information provided by recipients of their service, to apply duties of 
care, which can reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by national law, 
LQRUGHUWRGHWHFWDQGSUHYHQWFHUWDLQW\SHVRILOOHJDODFWLYLWLHV´ 
Finally, some articles of the Enforcement Directive4 are also relevant: 
³$UWLFOH- General obligation 
 
1. Member States shall provide for the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to 
ensure the enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by this Directive. Those 
measures, procedures and remedies shall be fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily 
complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays. 
 
2. Those measures, procedures and remedies shall also be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to 
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse. 
 
Article 8 - Right of information 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that, in the context of proceedings concerning an infringement 
of an intellectual property right and in response to a justified and proportionate request of the 
claimant, the competent judicial authorities may order that information on the origin and 
distribution networks of the goods or services which infringe an intellectual property right be 
provided by the infringer and/or any other person who: 
(a) was found in possession of the infringing goods on a commercial scale; 
(b) was found to be using the infringing services on a commercial scale; 
(c) was found to be providing on a commercial scale services used in infringing activities; 
or 
(d) was indicated by the person referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) as being involved in the 
production, manufacture or distribution of the goods or the provision of the services. 
 
2. The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall, as appropriate, comprise: 
(a) the names and addresses of the producers, manufacturers, distributors, suppliers and other 
previous holders of the goods or services, as well as the intended wholesalers and retailers; 
(b) information on the quantities produced, manufactured, delivered, received or ordered, as 
well as the price obtained for the goods or services in question. 
 
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply without prejudice to other statutory provisions which: 
(a) grant the rightholder rights to receive fuller information; 
(b) govern the use in civil or criminal proceedings of the information communicated pursuant 
to this Article; 
(c) govern responsibility for misuse of the right of information; 
or 
                                                          
4
 Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2044 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, OJ L 157, 30.4.2004, and corrigendum OJ L 195, 02/06/2004, p. 16-25 (further 
referred to as Enforcement Directive). 
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(d) afford an opportunity for refusing to provide information which would force the person 
referred to in paragraph 1 to admit to his/her own participation or that of his/her close 
relatives in an infringement of an intellectual property right; 
or 
(e) govern the protection of confidentiality of information sources or the processing of 
personal data. 
 
Article 9 - Provisional and precautionary measures 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that the judicial authorities may, at the request of the applicant: 
 
(a) issue against the alleged infringer an interlocutory injunction intended to prevent any 
imminent infringement of an intellectual property right, or to forbid, on a provisional basis 
and subject, where appropriate, to a recurring penalty payment where provided for by 
national law, the continuation of the alleged infringements of that right, or to make such 
continuation subject to the lodging of guarantees intended to ensure the compensation of the 
rightholder; an interlocutory injunction may also be issued, under the same conditions, 
against an intermediary whose services are being used by a third party to infringe an 
intellectual property right; injunctions against intermediaries whose services are used by a 
third party to infringe a copyright or a related right are covered by Directive 2001/29/EC; 
 
(b) order the seizure or delivery up of the goods suspected of infringing an intellectual 
property right so as to prevent their entry into or movement within the channels of commerce. 
 
2. In the case of an infringement committed on a commercial scale, the Member States shall 
ensure that, if the injured party demonstrates circumstances likely to endanger the recovery of 
damages, the judicial authorities may order the precautionary seizure of the movable and 
immovable property of the alleged infringer, including the blocking of his/her bank accounts 
and other assets. To that end, the competent authorities may order the communication of 
bank, financial or commercial documents, or appropriate access to the relevant information. 
 
3. The judicial authorities shall, in respect of the measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, 
have the authority to require the applicant to provide any reasonably available evidence in 
order to satisfy themselves with a sufficient degree of certainty that the applicant is the 
rightholder and that the applicant's right is being infringed, or that such infringement is 
imminent. 
 
4. Member States shall ensure that the provisional measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 
may, in appropriate cases, be taken without the defendant having been heard, in particular 
where any delay would cause irreparable harm to the rightholder. In that event, the parties 
shall be so informed without delay after the execution of the measures at the latest. 
 
A review, including a right to be heard, shall take place upon request of the defendant with a 
view to deciding, within a reasonable time after notification of the measures, whether those 
measures shall be modified, revoked or confirmed. 
 
5. Member States shall ensure that the provisional measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 
are revoked or otherwise cease to have effect, upon request of the defendant, if the applicant 
does not institute, within a reasonable period, proceedings leading to a decision on the merits 
of the case before the competent judicial authority, the period to be determined by the judicial 
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authority ordering the measures where the law of a Member State so permits or, in the 
absence of such determination, within a period not exceeding 20 working days or 31 calendar 
days, whichever is the longer. 
 
6. The competent judicial authorities may make the provisional measures referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 subject to the lodging by the applicant of adequate security or an 
equivalent assurance intended to ensure compensation for any prejudice suffered by the 
defendant as provided for in paragraph 7. 
 
7. Where the provisional measures are revoked or where they lapse due to any act or 
omission by the applicant, or where it is subsequently found that there has been no 
infringement or threat of infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities 
shall have the authority to order the applicant, upon request of the defendant, to provide the 
defendant appropriate compensation for any injury caused by those measures. 
 
Article 11 - Injunctions  
Member States shall ensure that, where a judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of 
an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer an 
injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement. Where provided for by 
national law, non-compliance with an injunction shall, where appropriate, be subject to a 
recurring penalty payment, with a view to ensuring compliance. Member States shall also 
ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries 
whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right, without 
prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC. 
 
B. Case law 
So far there is little EU case law on the important issue of the conditions of liability for 
Internet service providers (ISPs) and hosting sites (hosts) for copyright infringement. The 
questions referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have only addressed 
these issues at the edges. It is not very surprising for three reasons: 1) ISPs and hosts rarely 
qualify for primary liability namely communication to the public/making available content 
protected by copyright and related rights 2) secondary liability is still governed by national 
law, and 3) ISPs and hosts often benefit from the safe harbours provided for in the ECD.  
1. CJEU case law on copyright enforcement measures involving ISPs and hosts 
(Enforcement Directive and E-Commerce Directive) 
The CJEU has shed light on two separate but related issues concerning copyright 
enforcement, which have a link with the communication right among others. First, ISPs and 
by analogy host sites may be forced to disclose the identities (name and address) of alleged 
infringers to right holders so that they can commence civil proceedings. In Promusicae5 and 
Bonnier6, the Court of Justice ruled that the combined interpretation of the EU Charter of 
                                                          
5
 Promusicae v Telefonica, Case C-275/06, [2008] ECR I-271. In that case, Promusicae (which represents 
producers and publishers of musical and audiovisual recordings in Spain) asked Telefonica (an ISP) to disclose 
the identities of customers who they suspected were sharing copyright works via the P2P software Kazaa. It 
asked for this information so that it could commence civil proceedings against those individuals. The national 
court referred a question to the CJEU. 
6
 Bonnier et al. v Perfect Communication Sweden AB, Case C-461/10, 19 April 2012, available on 
www.curia.europa.eu  The CJEU held that the national (Swedish here) law in question respects, in principle, the 
principle of proportionality and strikes a fair the balance between the protection of personal data and the 
protection of copyright. 
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Fundamental Rights, the severaO µSULYDF\GDWD SURWHFWLRQ¶ GLUHFWLYHV WKH ,QIR6RF 'LUHFWLYH
and the Enforcement Directive allows but does not force Member States to take measures so 
that such intermediaries are obliged to give right holders personal information of clients who 
are suspected of copyright infringement. When Member States do so, the Court said that EU 
law obliges them to ensure a fair balance is struck between the several human rights at stake, 
namely the right of property of the copyright holders and the right to private life of the 
subscribers in this case. The Member States must also respect the principle of proportionality 
in their implementation of those directives. 
Second, ISPs and hosts may be forced to filter content in some cases. In Scarlet v SABAM7 
and SABAM v Netlog8, the questions asked by the Belgian courts to the CJEU were: may a 
0HPEHU6WDWH¶VFRXUWRUGHUDQ,63 (Scarlet) or a host (Netlog, a social network site) to put in 
place in respect of all its clients, in abstracto and preventively, at its exclusive charge and 
without time limitation, a system filtrating all its communications in order to identify files 
protected by copyright (namely audiovisual and musical works) and block their transfer? 
As tKHLQMXQFWLRQ¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFVZRXOGREOLJH,63s to check all communications of all their 
users, identify files with protected works, determine if they were shared unlawfully and block 
the files (in short it would amount to perpetual, systematic and universal filtering), such court 
order would infringe two fundamental freedoms: the ,63¶VIUHHGRPWRFRQGXFWEXVLQHVVDVit 
would have to install a costly, complicated and permanent computer system at its own cost 
and freedom of information as such filtering could block lawful content. It would also breach 
article 15 ECD (no general obligation to monitor) and article 3 of the Enforcement Directive 
which calls for equitable and proportionate measures. So in sum, in addition to the right 
KROGHU¶VULJKWWRSURSHUW\WKHULJKWRI,63VDQGKRVWVLWHVWRFRQGXFWDEXsiness and the right 
of subscribers to impart and receive information should also be taken into account when this 
balance between the three parties is struck. 
In L'Oréal SA v eBay, which dealt with the unauthorised sale on eBay (the famous online 
marketplaFHRI/¶2UpDOSURGXFWVE\H%D\XVHUVWKH&-(8UXOHGWKDWright holders may also 
ask injunctions to prevent future infringements.9 However, similarly to what the CJEU had 
said in Scarlet and repeated later in Netlog, right holders cannot ask an injunction so that the 
online provider actively monitors ³DOOWKHGDWDRIHDFKRILWVFXVWRPHUVLQRUGHUWRSUHYHQWDQ\
IXWXUHLQIULQJHPHQWRILQWHOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\ULJKWVYLDWKDWSURYLGHU¶VZHEVLWH´10 This would 
breach article 15 ECD and 3 of the Enforcement Directive. All we therefore know is that a 
SHUPDQHQWRUGHUWRILOWHUDOOFRPPXQLFDWLRQVRIDQ,63¶VRURIDKRVW¶Vusers does not strike a 
fair balance between all WKHSDUWLHV¶ fundamental rights. It may therefore mean that a special 
obligation to monitor is not ruled out (as recital 47 of the Infosoc Directive itself suggests) 
but to know the conditions, we would need a new CJEU decision. An indirect answer to this 
question should be given soon as an Austrian court has recently referred several questions to 
the CJEU, one of them asking whether it is compatible with EU law to require an access 
provider to take specific measures to make it more difficult for its customers to access a 
website containing material made available unlawfully if those measures require not 
inconsiderable costs and can easily be circumvented without any special technical 
NQRZOHGJH:KHUHDVLWGRHVQRWFRQFHUQILOWHULQJXVHUV¶FRPPXQLFDWLRQVDVVXFK, it involves 
                                                          
7
 Case C-70/10 (2012), available on www.curia.europa.eu 
8
 Case C-360/10 (2012), available on www.curia.europa.eu 
9
 Case C-324/09 L'Oreal SA v eBay [2011] E.C.R. I-000, para. 131, available on www.curia.europa.eu 
(interpreting article 11 of the Enforcement Directive). The case involved trademark infringements. 
10
 Ibid., para. 139. 
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a specific measure, namely the blocking of the access to a web site, which, unlike the filtering 
of all communications, does not involve inconsiderable costs.11 
In addition to the two issues above mentioned, in Google France v Louis Vuitton et al., the 
CJEU interpreted article 14 ECD for the first time.12 Like in /¶2UpDOYH%D\, the case did not 
concern copyright but trademarks, more particularly the system Google uses to reference web 
pages (Google search engine) along with its AdWords (advertisements which appear on the 
right hand side column of a web page next to the search results).13  This activity is not 
properly what a cloud computing provider generally does (as they generally only provide 
storage) but the ruling is interesting for our purposes as the Court interpreted the general 
meaning of article 14 ECD. The French Supreme Court asked the CJEU whether article 14 
ECD ³is to be interpreted as meaning that an internet referencing service constitutes an 
information society service consisting in the storage of information supplied by the 
DGYHUWLVHUZLWKWKHUHVXOWWKDWWKDWLQIRUPDWLRQLVWKHVXEMHFWRIµKRVWLQJ¶ZLWKLQWKHPHDQLQJ
of that article and that the referencing service provider therefore cannot be held liable prior to 
its being informed RI WKH XQODZIXO FRQGXFW RI WKDW DGYHUWLVHU´14 After establishing that the 
referencing system is an information society service within the meaning of the ECD, the 
CJEU KHOG WKDWDUWLFOH¶VVDIHKDUERXUDSSOLHVRQO\ LQ³FDVHV LQZKLFK WKHDFWLYLW\RI WKH
LQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\ VHUYLFHSURYLGHU LV µRIDPHUH WHFKQLFDO DXWRPDWLFDQGSDVVLYHQDWXUH¶
ZKLFK LPSOLHV WKDW WKDW VHUYLFH SURYLGHU µKDV QHLWKHU NQRZOHGJH RI QRU FRQWURO RYHU WKH
LQIRUPDWLRQ ZKLFK LV WUDQVPLWWHG RU VWRUHG¶´15 In other words, the question is whether the 
,63¶VUROHLVQHXWUDO Google plays an active role as it does choose the ranking of the results16 
and its role ³in the drafting of the commercial message which accompanies the advertising 
link or in the establishPHQWRUVHOHFWLRQRINH\ZRUGVLVUHOHYDQW´17 Therefore, the CJEU ruled 
                                                          
11
 See UPC Telekabel Wien, Case C-314/12, available on www.curia.europa.eu. The questions are as follows: 
³ ,V$UWLFOHRI WKH >,QIRVRF@'LUHFWLYH WREH LQWHUSUHWHGDVPHDQLQJ WKDWDSHUVRQZKRPDNHVSURWHFWHG
subject matter available on the internet without the right KROGHU¶V FRQVHQW LV XVLQJ WKH VHUYLFHV RI WKH DFFHVV
providers of persons seeking access to that protected subject matter? 
2. If the answer to the first question is in the negative, are reproduction for private use and transient and incident 
reproduction permissible only if the original reproduction was lawfully reproduced, distributed or made 
available to the public? 
3. If the answer to the first and second question is in the affirmative, and an injunction is therefore to be issued 
DJDLQVWWKHXVHU¶VDFFHss provider in accordance with Article 8(3) of the Directive, is this compatible with Union 
ODZLQSDUWLFXODUZLWKWKHQHFHVVDU\EDODQFHEHWZHHQWKHSDUWLHV¶IXQGDPHQWDOULJKWV" 
4. If the answer to the third question is in the negative, is it compatible with Union law to require an access 
provider to take specific measures to make it more difficult for its customers to access a website containing 
material made available unlawfully if those measures require not inconsiderable costs and can easily be 
circumvHQWHGZLWKRXWDQ\VSHFLDOWHFKQLFDONQRZOHGJH"´ 
12
 Google France v Louis Vuitton et al., Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 (2010), available on 
www.curia.europa.eu, paras 106-120. See for a comment Francesco Rizzuto, ³7KH OLDELOLW\ RI RQOLQH
LQWHUPHGLDU\ VHUYLFH SURYLGHUV IRU LQIULQJHPHQWV RI LQWHOOHFWXDO SURSHUW\ ULJKWV´ >@ Computers and 
Telecommunications Law Review, p. 4. 
13
 The CJEU gives an explanation of how AdWords work at para. 23 of judgment. 
14
 Google France, above n. 12, para. 106. 
15
 ,ELGSDUD³LW IROORZV IURPUHFLWDO LQ WKHSUHDPEOH WR'LUHFWLYH WKDW WKHH[HPSWLRQV IURP
liability established in that directive cover only cases in which the activity of the information society service 
SURYLGHU LV µRI D PHUH WHFKQLFDO DXWRPDWLF DQGSDVVLYHQDWXUH¶ ZKLFK LPSOLHV WKDW WKDW VHUYLFH SURYLGHU µKDV
QHLWKHUNQRZOHGJHRIQRUFRQWURORYHUWKHLQIRUPDWLRQZKLFKLVWUDQVPLWWHGRUVWRUHG¶´ 
16
 ,ELGSDUD³*RRJOHGHWHUPLQHVWKHRUGHURIGLVSOay according to, inter alia, the remuneration paid by the 
DGYHUWLVHUV´ 
17
 Ibid., para 118. 
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that article 14 ECD applies when the provider does not play ³DQDFWLYHUROHRIVXFKDNLQGDV
WRJLYHLWNQRZOHGJHRIRUFRQWURORYHUWKHGDWDVWRUHG´18  
 
What are the implications of this case law for cloud computing providers? If a user is 
LQIULQJLQJE\FRPPXQLFDWLQJSURWHFWHGFRQWHQWWRWKHSXEOLFRQDFORXGFRPSXWLQJSURYLGHU¶V
storage platform, right holders may use the notice and take down system in article 14 ECD 
against the cloud computing provider. In addition, they may also try to obtain an injunction 
against the cloud computing provider, but probably only against a specific act of a particular 
client (implicitly as per Scarlet and Netlog). The cloud computing provider will then have to 
block the infringing content posted by that user, arguably also for the future (as per /¶2UpDO). 
The question however poses itself whether national courts have to strike the balance between 
the different fundamental rights of the three stakeholders in all the cases where a permanent 
general injunction is not requested. It is not clear from Scarlet and Netlog whether the 
balance is only upset in case of such permanent general injunctions or may be upset in the 
case of certain specific injunctions. Arguably, national courts will be able to strike this 
balance without referring a question to the CJEU if they think that a specific injunction may 
in a specific case be too burdensome for the host or would encroach on freedom of 
expression. 
It is unclear whether the /¶2UpDO decision means that courts can issue stay-down orders, and 
if so of which type. Recently, the French Court of Cassation held that such stay-down orders 
cannot be ordered against hosts (in this case Google).19 Stay-down orders are those which 
oblige the host to prevent further postings of the same protected content if the right holder has 
already notified the host once about it. This is so even if the host has not been notified that 
the removed content has once again been re-posted. In short, one original notification is 
sufficient. The Court of Cassation held that a stay-down order imposes a general duty to 
monitor and thus goes against article 15 ECD. For the Court, such order obliges Google to 
block the content for an unlimited period of time and is a disproportionate measure in relation 
to the objective pursued. /¶2UpDO probably means that stay-down orders are not acceptable 
because if the host receives even just one notification for each customer in relation to one 
copyright work, it would have to check all postings of all its customers all the time to see if 
they do not re-post infringing content. Since URLs can change, if right holders are not 
obliged to further notify the host, it may in some cases put a heavy burden on WKH KRVWV¶ 
shoulders to identify the location of the content. In addition, as the Court said in /¶2UpDO, the 
measures cannot create barriers to legitimate trade and the ruling implies that the operator is 
not obliged to monitor the content notified which re-appears on its web site, as the Court says 
that ³LI WKH RSHUDWRU RI WKH RQOLQH PDUNHWSODFH GRHV QRW GHFLGH RQ LWV RZQ LQLWLDWLYH WR
suspend the perpetrator of the infringement of intellectual property rights in order to prevent 
further infringements of that kind by the same seller in respect of the same trade marks, it 
PD\EHRUGHUHGE\PHDQVRIDQLQMXQFWLRQWRGRVR´20 This also implies that the suspension 
                                                          
18
 ,ELGSDUD³,WIROORZVWKDWWKHDQVZHUWRWKHWKLUGTXHVWLRQLQ&DVH&-236/08, the second question in Case 
C-237/08 and the third question in Case C-238/08 is that Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 must be interpreted as 
meaning that the rule laid down therein applies to an internet referencing service provider in the case where that 
service provider has not played an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data 
stored. If it has not played such a role, that service provider cannot be held liable for the data which it has stored 
at the request of an advertiser, unless, having obtained knowledge of the unlawful nature of those data or of that 
DGYHUWLVHU¶VDFWLYLWLHVLWIDLOHGWRDFWH[SHGLWLRXVO\WRUHPRYHRUWRGLVDEOHDFFHVVWRWKHGDWDFRQFHUQHG´ 
19
 Cass. 12 July 2012, 1st ch. civ., Aufeminin.com v. Google France, available at 
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/827_12_23881.html (photograph 
appearing and re-appearing again on Google Images). 
20
 /¶2UpDO, above n. 9, paras 140-141. 
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RIDXVHU¶VDFFRXQWis a proportionate measure. So a host could be obliged to suspend or even 
maybe WHUPLQDWH D UHSHDW LQIULQJHU¶V DFFRXQW or at least warn them their account will be 
terminated if the host carries on receiving notifications from right holders, along the lines of 
WKHV\VWHPRIWKHµWKUHHVWULNHVDQG\RX¶UHRXW¶LQSODFHLQ)UDQFH21 This system obliges ISPs 
to notify users who the right holders suspect of file-sharing that their account will be 
terminated if they carry on file-sharing despite 3 warnings. This type of measure (suspension) 
is probably proportionate and thus respects article 3 of the Enforcement Directive. Some 
hosts have indeed already written this type of measure in their contract terms.22 So in effect, 
they already anticipate this problem and it should not pose itself too often. Nevertheless, 
/¶2UpDO is not entirely clear on the legitimacy of stay-down orders and a reference to the 
CJEU would help clarify the matter. 
2. CJEU case law on communication to the public including making available to the 
public 
More cases concerning the right of communication to the public were referred to the CJEU 
over the years. Most of the time they interpreted article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive but 
sometimes they involved articles 8 and 10 of the Rental and Lending Directive.23 The cases 
involved distributing television signals in hotels generally (SGAE24), providing, in the KRWHO¶V
bedrooms, apparatus (other than televisions and radios) and phonograms in physical or digital 
format so that the guests can hear them by means of the apparatus (Phonographic 
Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Ltd v Ireland25), transmitting broadcast works, via a 
television screen and speakers, in a pub (Football Association Premier League 26 ) and 
distributing radio signals (music) in a dental practice (Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) 
v. Marco Del Corso27).  
Importantly, in the latter case, the Court held that ³WKH FRQFHSWV DSSHDULQJ LQ 'LUHFWLYHV
DQGVXFKDVµFRPPXQLFDWLRQWRWKHSXEOLF¶PXVWEHLQWHUSUHWHGLQWKHOLJKWRI
                                                          
21
 HADOPI 1, i.e. Law n° 2009-669 favouring the diffusion and protection of creations on the Internet of 12 
June 2009 and HADOPI 2, i.e. Law n° 2009-1311 of 28 October 2009 concerning the criminal protection of 
literary and artistic property on Internet, available on www.legifrance.gouv.fr. ThH8.¶V'LJLWDO(FRQRP\$FW
(« DEA ») of 8 April 2010, available on http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/ukpga_20100024_en_1, 
establishes a similar system but is not yet in force. 
22
 See below YouTube and Facebook. 
23
 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right 
and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, OJ 2006 L 376, p. 
28 (further referred to as Rental and Lending Directive). 
24
 Case C-306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles SA [2006] 
E.C.R. I-11519 (art. 3 Infosoc Directive). Similar facts arose in a prior case, namely Case C-293/98, Entidad de 
Gestión de Derechos de los Productores Audiovisuales (EGEDA) v. Hosteleria Asturiana SA (Hoasa) [2000] 
E.C.R. I-0629, before the adoption of the Infosoc Directive. However, as the Satellite and Cable Directive did 
not enable the Court of Justice to answer the question and only national law applied, the court could not and did 
not in effect rule on the substance.  
25
 Case C-162/10, 2012, available on www.curia.europa.eu (reference to interpret Articles 8 and 10 of Directive 
2006/115), further referred to as PPL. 
26
 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Premier League v. QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v. Media 
Protection Services [2012] F.S.R. 1 (WKH TXHVWLRQ ZDV ³ZKHWKHU µFRPPXQLFDWLRQ WR WKH SXEOLF¶ ZLWKLQ WKH
meaning of Article 3(1) of the Copyright Directive must be interpreted as covering transmission of the broadcast 
works, via a television screen and speakers, to the customers present in a public house´, paras 183-207. The 
case is further referred to as FAPL. 
27
 Case C-135/10, 2012, available on www.curia.europa.eu.  Reference to interpret both art. 8(2) of the old 
Rental and Lending Directive (Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending 
right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, OJ 1992 L 346, p. 61) and art. 
3 Infosoc Directive. Note that the dentist was providing the radio signals free of charge and without any active 
choice on the part of his patients. 
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the equivalent concepts contained in those international agreements and in such a way that 
they are compatible with those agreements, taking account of the context in which those 
concepts are found and the purpose of the relevant provisions of the agreements as regards 
inteOOHFWXDOSURSHUW\´28 The Court also refers to the definition of communication to the public 
in the WIPO Glossary of Terms of the Law of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, which is 
not legally binding: ³PDNLQJ D ZRUN SHUIRUPDQFH SKRQRJUDP or broadcast perceptible in 
any appropriate manner to persons in general, that is, not restricted to specific individuals 
EHORQJLQJ WR D SULYDWH JURXS´29 So it is clear that the CJEU firmly thinks that the WIPO 
treaties are crucial to interpret the concept of communication to the public in the EU legal 
order.  
7KH,QIR6RF'LUHFWLYHGRHVQRWGHILQHµFRPPXQLFDWLRQWRWKHSXEOLF¶ but the CJEU held that 
apart from having to be interpreted in conformity with international law, the term must, 
according to recital 23 of the Infosoc Directive, also be interpreted broadly. To determine 
whether the acts in all these cases were communications to the public, the Court elaborated 
several factors: 1) public means an ³indeterminate number of potential [television] viewers or 
[radio] listeners´30 and a ³IDLUO\ODUJHQXPEHURISHRSOH´ 2) the public must be a new public 
i.e. ³different from the public at which the original act of communication of the work is 
directed´31, 3) the public must be targeted and receptive, 4) the public is present at the place 
RIWKHRSHUDWRU¶VKRWHOSXEGHQWLVW transmission, but is not present at the place where the 
communication originates, that is to say, at the place of the representation or performance 
which is broadcast32, 5) the operator is intentionally distributing the works i.e. without the 
intervention of the hotel, pub or dentist, this new public cannot receive the signals,33 and 6) 
WKHRSHUDWRU¶VFRPPXQLFDWLRQLVIRUSURILW (e.g. the hotel renders an additional service when 
communicating works to its clients and profits from it; tKH KRWHO¶V DFWLRQ LV DQ DGGLWLRQDO
service which has an effect on the standing of hotel and price of rooms and is likely to attract 
more guests). 
Several factors are irrelevant: 1) whether the customers have or not switched the television or 
radio on - it is sufficient that the apparatus and the signal or protected content are provided 
(art. 3 Infosoc and art. 8 WCT VD\³LQVXFKDZD\WKDWWKHSHUVRQVIRUPLQJWKDWSXEOLFmay 
                                                          
28
 SCF, above n. 27, para. 55. See also para. 71. 
29
 SCF, above n. 27, para. 85. 
30
 In the several cases, the Court refers to its previous rulings in Lagardère (Case C-192/04 [2005] E.C.R. I-
7199) and Mediakabel (Case C-89/04 [2005] E.C.R. I-4891) to say the notion of public refers to an 
indeterminate number of potential television viewers. In SCF, the FRXUW VD\V ³[a]s regards [...] the 
µLQGHWHUPLQDWH¶QDWXUHRIWKHSXEOLF WKH&RXUWKDVREVHUYHGWKDWDFFRUGLQJWRWKHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWRI
µFRPPXQLFDWLRQ WR WKH SXEOLF¶ JLYHQ E\ WKH :,32 JORVVDU\ ZKLFK ZKLOH QRW OHJDOO\ ELQGLQJ QRQH WKH OHVV
shHGV OLJKW RQ WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSW RI SXEOLF LW PHDQV µPDNLQJ D ZRUN « SHUFHSWLEOH LQ DQ\
appropriate manner to persons in general, that is, not restricted to specific individuals belonging to a private 
JURXS¶´ 
31
 ³When those authors authorise a broadcast of their works, they consider, in principle, only the owners of 
television sets who, either personally or within their own private or family circles, receive the signal and follow 
WKH EURDGFDVWV´ FAPL, above n. 26, para. 198. In PPL, the court added on this factor that the hotel derives 
economic benefits from the transmission independent of those obtained by the broadcaster or producer of 
phonogram. 
32
 FAPL, above n. 26, para. 203. 
33
 In PPL, the Court refers to SCF DQG VD\V DW SDUD  ³7Ke user makes an act of communication when it 
intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of its action, to give access to a broadcast containing the 
protected work to its customers. In the absence of that intervention, its customers, although physically within the 
area covered by the broadcast, would not, in principle, be able to enjoy the broadcast work (SCF, paragraph 
´(PSKDVLVDGGHG6DPHZRUGLQJDWSDUDRISGAE³WKHKRWHOLVWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQZKLFKLQWHUYHQHVLQIXOO
knowledge of the consHTXHQFHVRILWVDFWLRQWRJLYHDFFHVVWRWKHSURWHFWHGZRUNWRLWVFXVWRPHUV´ 
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DFFHVVLW´34), 2) which technique is used to transmit the signal and 3) whether the place where 
the communication takes place is private or public.35 Last but not least, the mere provision of 
physical facilities is not a communication to the public.36  
 
In all the cases before the CJEU, the operator was providing the apparatus on which to view 
or hear the content (television, radio etc) and the content or signal enabling the content to be 
viewed and/or heard. The factors were met in the hotel and pub cases but factors 3 and 6 were 
not fulfilled in the dentist case. In addition, in the SCF and PPL cases, the Court of Justice 
held that the concept of communication to the public requires individual assessment.37 The 
FRXUWFDUULHVRQVD\LQJWKDW³IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIVXFKDQDVVHVVPHQWDFFRXQWKDVWREHWDNHQ
of several complementary criteria, which are not autonomous and are interdependent. 
Consequently, they must be applied individually and in their interaction with one another, 
given that they may, in different situations, be present to widely varying degrees (see SCF, 
SDUDJUDSK´38 Nevertheless, then the Court assesses the concept of communication to the 
public with the same factors as under article 3 InfoSoc Directive, i.e. those mentioned just 
above.39 So is the concept of communication to the public different in the Rental and Lending 
Directive and the Infosoc Directive?40 It does not seem it is, at least at the moment, as the 
Court used the same criteria in all the communication to the public cases. However, it left 
itself the possibility of crafting a broader concept in relation to article 3 Infosoc Directive 
than to article 8 of the Rental and Lending Directive.41 Depending how the Court would 
differentiate between authors on the one hand and performers and broadcasting organisations 
on the other, the Court will have to respect international conventions. So for instance, as per 
the Convention and the Rental and Lending Directive, it may restrict the broadcasting 
RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ULJKW to the showing of television programmes in places made accessible to the 
public only if the defendant does so against payment of an entrance fee.42   
 
If we apply these factors to hosts, it seems clear a priori that they merely provide the facilities 
(storage, web site) but not the content. The content is provided by the users. However, if there 
is doubt as to whether the content is really only provided by the user, i.e. that the cloud 
computing provider intervenes in some way, all the other factors listed above are generally 
fulfilled and the case law would apply. Because of the rather simple nature of the facts of the 
cases referred to the CJEU, the case law does not envisage many types of involvement the 
operator or intermediary can have. But UK courts for instance have further elaborated on this 
concept. 
                                                          
34
 Emphasis added. 
35
 According to art. 3 Infosoc Directive and 8 WCT. So the private nature of hotel rooms does not preclude the 
communication of copyright protected works from being public. 
36
 This also appears in the agreed statement on article 8 WCT. See 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/statements.html See also J. Reinbothe and S. von Lewinski, The WIPO 
Treaties 1996: The WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Commentary 
and Legal Analysis, Butterworths, London, 2002, S  ZKR DGG WKDW WKH WHUP µPHUH¶ ³PHDQV WKDW WKLV
exclusion from the act of communication must be interSUHWHGUHVWULFWLYHO\´ 
37
 See para. 29, PPL n. 25 above and para. 78, SCF n. 27 above. 
38
 PPL, para 30. 
39
 SCF, para 92. Ibid. in PPL. 
40
 $OH[DQGHU5RVVDQG&ODLUH/LYLQJVWRQH³&RPPXQLFDWLRQWRWKHSXEOLF3DUW´(QWHUWDLQPHQW
Law Review 209-213, at 213, think not. 
41
 The Rental and Lending Directive only concerns the SHUIRUPHUV¶ DQG EURDGFDVWLQJ RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ ULJKW RI
communication to the public.  
42
 Art. 13 Rome Convention and art. 8(3) Rental and Lending Directive.  
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UK courts have generally followed the EU case law on the communication to the public by 
the letter. 43  However, in Newzbin 144 , the High Court of England and Wales held that 
Newzbin itself, a website on a worldwide Internet discussion system called Usenet, was liable 
for infringement of the right of communication to the public, and not only the users who were 
uploading films on Newzbin. The report of the case summarises well how the site works so 
that the relevant passage can simply be quoted:  
³In relation to binary (i.e. non-text) content, Newzbin provided premium members with a 
facility which extended considerably beyond indexing and categorisation. It identified all (or 
in the case of the RAW index, many) of the, perhaps several thousand, messages which made 
up a particular binary work and, in so doing, saved those members the very substantial task of 
manually locating and identifying each of them separately. Moreover, the reports in the 
Newzbin index provided a considerable body of very useful information in relation to each 
title. They included descriptive information, the URL and an NFO file which identified the 
individual user who posted the content to Usenet, the email address of that user, information 
from which the date on which the content was posted to Usenet could be deduced and the 
number of files making up the particular work. Newzbin DOVRSURYLGHG WKH³1=%´ IDFLOLW\
Upon the press of a button, this system created an NZB file which was delivered to the 
PHPEHU¶s computer where it could be stored. When run by the member it caused the news 
client to fetch all of the Usenet messages and reassemble the original binary work from its 
component parts and so, in the case of a copyright work, inevitably make an infringing copy. 
Once a work had bHHQHQWHUHGRQWRWKHGHIHQGDQW¶s Newzbin index, use of the NZB facility 
was bound to result in that work being copied.´45  
 
The court ruled that the factors were fulfilled. First, the site was for profit as the users had to 
pay a membership fee, Newzbin was not passive because it did not simply provide a link to 
sites where illegal copies of films were available, it provided an indexing and cataloguing 
system and the NZB facility to download the films at the press of a button allowed users to 
DYRLG ³GD\V RI SRWHQWLDOO\ IXWLOH HIIRUW LQ VHHNLQJ WR JDWKHU WKRVH PHVVDJHV WRJHWKHU IRU
WKHPVHOYHV´ 46  The users were a new public and Newzbin provided the service in full 
knowledge of the consequences of its actions.47 The court does not discuss factors 1, 3 and 4 
but they were obviously fulfilled in this case. 
 
The facts are different from those in question in the CJEU case law because Newzbin did not 
store nor transmit the protected content. So the decision arguably goes beyond the CJEU¶V 
case law because in the facts before the Court of Justice, the hotel or pub provided the 
apparatus (TV, radio or other device) and the signal or the DVD or CD to its guests. As Ross 
and Livingstone say, ³[u]ntil this [Newzbin] decision it was generally thought that a finding 
of infringement by way of CTTP required the defendant itself to store and make available the 
content. The case made clear that an intervention to assist in the process of transmission can 
also amount to CTTP. ... In Newzbin, the users would still have been able to access the 
content absent the Newzbin website, but with greater difficulty - the Newzbin software made 
                                                          
43
 The relevant case law is constituted basically by Newzbin I (see below) and Dramatico et al. v British Sky 
Broadcasting et al. [2012] EWHC 268 as the CJEU has not yet ruled in ITV Broadcasting v TV Catch Up, Case 
C-607/11, available on www.curia.europa.eu. See Ross and Livingstone above n. 40. The exception so far is the 
ruling in FAPL on remand because it goes further and also adds that there is a performance in public in addition 
to a communication to the public. 
44
 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin [2010] FSR 512. 
45
 Ibid., at 513-514.  
46





the location and access to the content considerably easier. The judgment therefore takes the 
CTTP concept a stage further than Rafael´48  
 
3. Relationship between the case law on ǯ and on the 
right of communication to the public 
There is convergence between the EU case law on article 14 ECD on the one hand and on the 
right of communication to the public on the other. Under the right of communication to the 
public case law, the role of the operator must be that it intervenes to give access to the 
content in full knowledge of the consequences of its actions. Under article 14 ECD case law, 
to benefit from the safe harbour, the SURYLGHU¶VUROHPXVWEHµRIDPHUHWHFKQLFDODXWRPDWLF
DQGSDVVLYHQDWXUH¶ZKLFK LPSOLHV WKDW WKDWSURYLGHU µKDVQHLWKHUNQRZOHGJHRIQRUFRQWURO
RYHUWKHLQIRUPDWLRQZKLFKLVWUDQVPLWWHGRUVWRUHG¶,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHU
WKH,63¶VUROH is neutral. Arguably, intervention with knowledge on the one hand and having 
an active role or controlling on the other, are the same thing.   
There may also be convergence between the CJEU case law and the secondary liability case 
law at national level. While this is beyond the scope of this paper, it is an issue worth looking 
into though as it may be that through the interpretation of article 14 ECD and 3 InfoSoc 
Directive, the CJEU is in fact harmonising (part of) of the national law on secondary liability 
by the back door. 
In the following section, the above case law is applied to scenarios involving several possible 
activities of cloud computing providers. 
II. Scenarios  
There are several variables: type of 
1) person involved: the cloud provider (private, public, hybrid cloud), the user (client of 
the cloud computing provider), the audience (the public) 
2) copyright work or subject-matter protected by related rights including database sui 
generis right: generated by user, a third party, the cloud computing provider or 
derivative 
3) act: public or private storage (hosting) or retrieval 
First, by public, private and hybrid cloud, I refer to the public or private nature of the 
communication made via the cloud. If content stored on the cloud is accessible not only to the 
user who has contracted with the cloud computing provider but also to the wider world, then 
it is a public cloud and vice versa. A hybrid cloud is a cloud where some parts of the content 
stored in the cloud are available only to the user and its organisation, friends, family and part 
of the content stored is available to the public. The definition therefore used in this paper 
                                                          
48
 Ross and Livingstone, above n. 40, at 211. Note that CTTP = communication to the public. See also Maurizio 
%RUJKL ³&KDVLQJ FRS\ULJKW LQIULQJHPHQW LQ WKH VWUHDPLQJ ODQGVFDSH´ >@ ,,& S  ³For instance, in 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v. Newzbin Ltd, a UK court, referring to the CJEU decision in SGAE v. Rafael 
Hoteles SA, found that an infringement of the public communication right occurs by merely providing of access 
to otherwise inaccessible protected works, regardless of whether the act of providing access (by means of a 
cataloguing and indexing system) LVPHUHO\³SDVVLYH´DQGGRHVQRWHQJDJH LQDQ\DFWXDO WUDQVPLVVLRQRI WKH
content to users´(emphasis added).  
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should not be confused with the National Institute of Standards and Technolog\¶V definitions 
of public, private and hybrid clouds and other similar definitions.49 
The question is when the cloud computing provider is liable for communication to the public 
and is twofold: when are cloud computing providers liable under article 14 ECD and does the 
communication to the public case law apply to them as well? As to the latter, first, virtually 
all cloud computing providers will be profit-making so that this factor is met. Second, it of 
course depends if the content that is stored is communicated to the public. But most 
importantly, one needs to see if the situation of a host or cloud computing provider is similar 
to that of a hotel or pub. Like hotels and pubs, host sites provide a web site or storage space 
µDSSDUDWXV¶ZKHUHXVHUVFDQXSORDGFRQWent. However, they do noWSURYLGHWKHVLJQDOWKDW¶V
the ISP, nor the conteQWWKDW¶VWKHXVHUVWKHPVHOYHV. The simple provision of apparatus (for 
host sites the web site and software to upload content) without the content is not making the 
provider liable. But is this what the host or cloud computing provider is always doing? It 
depends on their (degree of) involvement. The scenarios below give answers to these 
questions under both article 14 ECD and the communication to the public case law. I have 
chosen some of the most well-known and most used types of cloud computing providers as 
examples. 
A.  Scenario 1 Ȃ Ǯprivate cloudǯ (e.g. email service, music locker) 
(1) If the cloud computing service is private e.g. an email service or music locker, it does not 
mean that all is private and that neither the user nor the host is communicating anything to the 
public. If the user only emails works generated by himself or only listens to his own music 
alone (in private), then nothing is public and there is no communication to the public. 
However, a user could use his music locker to animate a party or email third party or 
derivative copyright works to a vast number of people. These are communications to the 
public made by the user as the conditions of CJEU case law on the communication to the 
public right are fulfilled. Unless the user is sheltered by an exception (e.g. educational use, 
parody...), the user infringes the communication to the public right.  
As to the cloud computing provider (host), it is debatable whether factors 5 and 6 of the EU 
communication to the public case law (intervention and profit) are fulfilled. Indeed, without 
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 ³The National Institute of Standards and Technology has determined four different cloud computing 
deployment models: private cloud, community cloud, public cloud and hybrid cloud.  
Private cloud: The cloud infrastructure is obtained for private use by a single organisation, whether managed 
internally or by a third party hosted internally or externally. 
Community cloud: The cloud infrastructure is provided for exclusive use by a specific community of consumers 
from organisations that have shared concerns (e.g. mission, security requirements, policy and compliance 
considerations). It may be owned, managed and operated by one or more of the organisations in the community, 
a third party or some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises.  
Public cloud: This is the most popular cloud computing model as it is available for open use by the general 
public. Here the cloud infrastructure is owned and operated by a third party, who provides cloud computing 
services to multiple clients (individuals or corporations) generally on a pay as you use model. This is the most 
preferred model as it provides computing services at the lowest cost, which is favourable for individuals and 
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Hybrid cloud: The hybrid cloud computing model is a combination of other cloud models (private, community 
or public), and this method is most commonly a cloud within a large organisation. An organisation may use a 
private cloud storage provider in the case of sensitive/proprietary data in order to have total control over them, 
or a public cloud storage provider in the case of less sensitive data. In simple terms, a hybrid cloud infrastructure 
is a combination of two or more distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community or public) that remain unique 
entities, but are bound together by standardised or proprietary technology that enables data and application 
portaELOLW\´6HHNaqeeb Ahmed .D]LD³$QRYHUYLHZRIFORXGFRPSXWLQJDQGLWVOHJDOLPSOLFDWLRQVLQ,QGLD´
[2012] Computers and Telecommunications Law Review 47, at 49.  
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the site, the user could not communicate the works at his party in that form or as easily 
anyway. So factor 5 could arguably be fulfilled at least under Newzbin. As to factor 6, it may 
be said that the host site does not benefit from the communication LQ LWVHOI EXW LVQ¶W the 
question whether the service is for profit",VQ¶WWKHattraction or at least one attraction of these 
hosting platforms allowing the very possibility RIXVLQJRQH¶VPXVLF ORFNHUDWDSDUW\? The 
user can throw a party anywhere any time by just logging on the web. No need to transport all 
his or her music everywhere he goes; ZLWKWKHKRVWLQJVLWHLW¶VDOZD\VDYDLODEOHHYHU\ZKHUH
all of it in one place. This may be stretching it. Indeed, the cloud computing provider does not 
know what the user is going to do with the music. It differs from the pub owner or hotel. In 
any case, factor 3 will in all likelihood not be fulfilled as it is the user, not the host, who 
targets the audience. How about article 14 ECD? As we saw, DUWLFOH¶VVDIHKDUERXUDSSOLHV
RQO\LQ³FDVHVLQZKLFKWKHDFWLYLW\RIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVRFLHW\VHUYLFHSURYLGHULVµRIDPHUH
WHFKQLFDODXWRPDWLFDQGSDVVLYHQDWXUH¶ZKLFKLPSOLHVWKDWWKDWVHUYLFHSURYLGHUµKDVQHLWKHU
NQRZOHGJH RI QRU FRQWURO RYHU WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ ZKLFK LV WUDQVPLWWHG RU VWRUHG¶, or in other 
words when the intermediary does not play ³DQ DFWLve role of such a kind as to give it 
NQRZOHGJH RI RU FRQWURO RYHU WKH GDWD VWRUHG´ Certainly in this situation, the cloud 
computing provider is just providing storage, its activity is passive. It does not know that the 
user is using the music to throw a party. So the cloud computing provider is sheltered by 
article 14 ECD. 
(2) In a private cloud computing environment, the cloud computing provider could also 
communicate copyright works generated by the user, either intentionally or negligently for 
instance leaking the FOLHQW¶VRUWKLUGSDUW\protected content (emails or documents generated 
by the client or his or her music collection) stored in the cloud.50 In this scenario, it is clear 
that under EU case law, the host communicates the work to the public. Article 14 ECD does 
not apply since it is clear that the host is active, even if as a result of a mistake or negligence. 
Of course, if there is a licence between the host and the user, no such infringement arises. 
Indeed, in some cases, the service agreement between the cloud computing provider and the 
user will say that the user transfers the copyright or gives the host a licence for all the content 
the user creates to the cloud computing provider. This is generally not the case for pure email 
accounts51 but more often the case for other services such as social network sites, at least for 
most of the content posted.52 
B.  Scenario 2 Ȃ Ǯǯ (e.g. YouTube) 
A public cloud computing setting (e.g. Wikipedia, YouTube), by definition, does not only 
involve a relationship between the client and cloud computing provider but between the 
client, the cloud computing provider and the public. Therefore, we are a situation very much 
like that we knew before the relatively recent explosion of cloud computing namely that of 
hosts envisaged in the ECD. So article 14 ECD is potentially applicable LQYDULRXV µSXEOLF
FORXG¶ VLWXDWLRQV. Several situations can occur depending on the involvement of the cloud 
computing provider.  
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 See e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19699205 and http://archives.lesoir.be/facebook-publie-par-
erreur-des-messages-prives-sur_t-20120924-
023UFW.html?query=facebook&firstHit=0&by=10&sort=datedesc&when=-
1&queryor=facebook&pos=6&all=4203&nav=1 (in September 2012, there were allegations that Facebook 
OHDNHGXVHUV¶SULYDWHFRQYHUVDWLRQVDVDUHVXOWRIDEXJ 
51
 See e.g. clause 3.1 of the Microsoft Services Agreement, available at http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
US/windows-live/microsoft-services-agreement   
52
 See e.g. clauses 2 and 5 of Facebook¶VWHUPVDYDLODEOHDW http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms, which relate 
to intellectual property rights. 
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Let us take first the example of YouTube. A priori, YouTube is the perfect example of a 
typical application of article 14 ECD so it should be off the hook. However, it may not be so 
clear-cut. Typically, when a user searches for a video, YouTube suggests other similar ones, 
which would potentially interest the user. Even, simply by accessing the YouTube URL 
before typing a search request, the site suggests videos based on video searches one has done 
before or on more generally based on RQH¶V browsing history. It even controls the order of the 
videos its web page VKRZVDIWHUDXVHU¶VVHDUFKIn this case, it cannot be said that YouTube is 
merely passive or does not know or control the information displayed. Therefore, it would be 
liable under article 14 ECD. Does this behaviour (suggestions) amount to communicating to 
the public according to the factors elaborated by the CJEU? Arguably all factors are fulfilled 
including factors 3 and 5 (targeted and receptive public and YouTube is not merely passive). 
Even if without the intervention of YouTube, users would have access to the content it would 
be far more difficult for them to access it or even they would not have accessed it as they 
would not have thought about it and searched for it. The factual situation is close to that in 
the Google France CJEU case.53 Of course, even if YouTube suggests other content, since all 
content on YouTube should be lawful (YouTube has been put on notice content is unlawful 
and acted expeditiously to remove it or it is userV¶ content and they have by definition given 
permission to the public to view the content they upload54), even if YouTube communicates 
that content to the whole wide world, it does not amount to copyright infringement. As stated 
above in section I, YouTube anG VLPLODU VRFLDO VLWHV¶ WHUPV DQG FRQGLWLRQV LQFRUSRUDWH
information about the notice and take down system and warn users that their account will be 
terminated if they repeatedly infringe.55 Some national courts have had to deal with these 
aspects of YouTube and have come to diverging conclusions. Some courts considered 
YouTube as not sheltered by the safe harbour because they think it plays an active role (e.g. it 
presents videos as its own content, proposes links to other videos). However, a French court 
considered DailyMotion, a similar video-sharing site, as sheltered.56 
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 $UHFHQW)UHQFKFDVHLQYROYLQJ*RRJOH¶VVHDUFKHQJLQHLQYROYHVVRPHZKDWVLPLODUIDFWVEXWFRPPXQLFDWLRQ
to the public was not strictly in issue. The national union of phonogram publishers sued Google because its 
VHDUFK HQJLQH¶V DXWR-complete function pointed towards illegal downloading web sites (the auto-complete 
function suggests sites based on the number of searches done by users). The Court of Cassation held that the 
search engine suggestion function provided a means of copyright infringement and that by disabling this 
function Google could make the finding of such illegal sites more difficult. See Cass., 1st ch civ., 12 July 2012, 
SNEP v. Google France, available at 
http://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/832_12_23884.html The basis of 
the judgment was articles L. 335-4 et L. 336-2 of the French Intellectual Property Code, which provide in the 
main that courts can order injunctions to prevent or stop infringements against those who can contribute to 
prevent or stop them.  
54
 6HH <RX7XEH¶V WHUPV RI XVH, available at http://www.youtube.com/static?gl=GB&template=terms, esp. 
clauses 7.2 and 8.1, accessed 24 September 2012 (user retains ownership rights but grants limited licenced rights 
to YouTube i.e. a worldwide non exclusive royalty free transferable licence to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare 
derivative works, display and perforP WKH FRQWHQW ( 9DOJDHUHQ DQG 1 5RODQG ³<RX7XEH DQG VRFLDO
networking sites ± 1HZNLGVRQWKHEORFN"´LQ$6WURZHO	-37ULDLOOHHGVGoogle et les nouveaux services 
HQOLJQH,PSDFWVXUO¶pFRQRPLHGXFRQWHQXHWTXHVWLRQVGHSURSULpWpLQWHOOHFWXHOOH, Larcier 2008, p. 207, at 208: 
³DQ\XSORDGHUJUDQWV<RX7XEHDOLFHQFHWRGLVWULEute and modify the uploaded material for any purpose as long 
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 See e.g. Facebook terms, above n. 52, clause 5.5.; clause 6 of YouTube terms, above n. 54, states that a repeat 
infringer is someone who has infringed more than twice. Valgaeren and Roland, above n. 54, DW³:KLOH
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infringements, some commentators consider rather that, unlike Grokster and Napster cases, YouTube and some 
of the other related platforms events have demonstrated a conscious effort to satisfy the notice-and-take down 
procedures as well as establish a termination policy for repeDWLQIULQJHUV´ 
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 See the decisions referred to by the Commission Staff Working Document, Online Services, including E-
Commerce, in the Single Market, (Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the 




Facebook also makes suggestions to its users. For instance, it notifies Facebook users when a 
friend is listening to music and suggests a link to that music. However, it only links to Spotify 
which is a legal music web site that users need to register for. So even if its role is arguably 
active, it does not infringe.  
In a hybrid cloud situation (e.g. in most cases Picasa, Facebook, Google Documents), part of 
the storage may be publicly available, part private. So the developments made above under 
I.A and II.B apply respectively.  
As can be seen from the above examples, cloud computing providers/host sites in both 
private and public situations are well advised to write down in the contracts for user storage 
and retrieval that they are not responsible for the user¶VXVHRI third party copyright content. 
As we saw above, many cloud computing providers include this in the terms of their service 
agreements. For instance, some services (e.g. Hotmail57) bind the user by a clause which puts 
the entire responsibility on the user for the content s/he transmits or stores via its services. 
Some agreements add that cloud computing providers will act if they notice or are put on 
notice of illegal activity, including copyright infringement, by the user. The agreement 
VRPHWLPHVDGGVWKDWWKHFORXGFRPSXWLQJSURYLGHUPD\HYHQWHUPLQDWHWKHXVHU¶VDFFRunt if 
this happens (e.g. YouTube and Facebook policy for repeat infringers). The terms put the 
user on notice that if they upload infringing content they will have to bear the consequences. 
Does this mean that cloud computing providers are never communicating to the public? They 
cannot evade such liability by contract. Indeed, the contract only binds the user but the 
communication to the public is done with reference to the right holder who is not bound by 
the contract. Thus such a clause does not prevent liability in case the host site intervenes for 
instance by suggesting content.  
C. Other problems that cloud computing providers may face 
As per the scenarios above, the law seems easy to follow for cloud computing providers and 
many hosts have incorporated terms to reflect the law. However, the national case law 
interpreting the relevant provisions of the ECD has led to a number of uncertainties, owing on 
the one hand to technological developments since the adoption of the ECD and second, to the 
vagueness of some terms used in the ECD. The Commission launched a consultation on the 
ECD and drafted a paper to address the concerns raised by the responses.58 In the main, the 
uncertainties relate to:  
- The lack of clarity of the definition of intermediary activities in articles 12 to 14 
- The lack of clarity of the conditions for benefiting from the safe harbour in articles 12 
to 14  
- The variety of "notice-and-takedown" procedures 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Regions, A Coherent Framework to Boost Confidence in the Digital Single Market of E-Commerce and Other 
Online Services, COM(2011) 942 final, SEC(2011) 1640 final), Brussels, 11.1.2012, SEC(2011) 1641 final, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communication2012/SEC2011_1641_en.pdf, 
p. 27-28. 
57
 See clause 3.1 of the Microsoft Services Agreement, available at http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
US/windows-live/microsoft-services-agreement ³3.1. Who owns the content that I put on the services? Content 
includes anything you upload to, store on, or transmit through the services, such as data, documents, photos, 
YLGHRPXVLFHPDLODQG LQVWDQWPHVVDJHV³FRQWHQW´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for, or endorse the content WKDW\RXDQGRWKHUVPDNHDYDLODEOHRQWKHVHUYLFHV´ 
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 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/communication_2012_en.htm  
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- The extent of the degree of monitoring allowed under Article 15.59  
First, national courts diverge as to who can be considered a host. For instance, an Italian court 
considered the Pirate Bay as a P2P file-sharing service, while in Sweden it was considered as 
a host.60 Second, national courts diverge as to what activities are sheltered under article 14. 
For instance, some courts consider video-sharing sites as not sheltered because of their active 
role while others do.61 Some national courts have used this element of control to find the host 
liable, for instance if a blog H[HUFLVHVHGLWRULDOFRQWURORQLWVXVHUV¶SRVWV.62 As we saw, the 
Google France and eBay cases have however taken away some of this confusion. Also 
national case law is contradictory on the conditions of article 14 such as what is meant by 
µH[SHGLWLRXVO\¶ DQG µDFWXDO NQRZOHGJH¶63 The eBay ruling has not entirely cleared up the 
second of these terms. A third concern has to do with the notice-and-take-down procedures. 
Many hosts have included such procedure within their terms of service and thus can decide 
on their own account to take down material which they themselves think is infringing 
copyright without a notification of right holders or a fortiori without a court order. Some 
respondents worry that these removals may chill speech as intermediaries are not judges and 
cannot always64 know whether content is illegal.65 The actual procedures in any case differ a 
lot between Member States and stakeholders are divided on how the procedure should be 
revised. An example, which was addressed also above, is whether stay-down orders should be 
allowed. Many stakeholders also note that the user should be able to defend the legality of the 
content.66 In this respect, VRPHKRVWV¶contract terms include the possibility to appeal.67  The 
Commission has therefore announced the launch of an impact assessment on procedures for 
notifying and acting on illegal online content in 2012 in order to determine whether the EU 
needs to act. The final main concern relates to the extent of monitoring allowed under article 
15. As we addressed above, the problem is going to be for national courts to assess in each 
case if a specific obligation to monitor respects the balance between the fundamental rights of 
all the parties involved. In this respect, further guidance from the CJEU, or better, revision of 
the ECD, may be necessary. 
 
All these uncertainties may thus affect cloud computing providers as they host user content. 
Conclusion  
What can be said in conclusion? First, the 1996 WIPO Internet treaties are as such not 
outdated in relation to cloud computing. The provisions on communication to the public fully 
apply to them. In addition, the Beijing Treaty has now filled the gap in relation to 
communication to the public of audiovisual performances both unfixed and previously fixed 
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in audiovisual fixations (articles 2, 6, 10 and 11 of the Treaty).68 However, the case law over 
the years has generated a number of questions and the legal framework should be made more 
precise to remove uncertainties. The Commission has started to address these issues in its 
6WDII:RUNLQJ'RFXPHQW³Online Services, Including E-Commerce, in the Single Market´. 
7KH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V LPPLQHQW LQLWLDWLYH RQ QRWLFH-and-take-down procedures will hopefully 
also lead to a clearer and harmonised framework which will help cloud computing providers 
clarifying their liability for the content they store on behalf of their users. In view of the 
global nature of the issues, it would be best if clarifications and additions were made to the 
WIPO Internet treaties and the Beijing Treaty but the usual slowness may be a hindrance.  
7KH &-(8¶V TV Catch Up upcoming decision may provide more details on the notion of 
communication to the public but probably nothing will come out which helps answering the 
questions this paper addressed, namely cloud computing provider liability.69 On the other 
hand, the CJEU decision in UPC Telekabel Wien should shed some more light on the extent 
of an obligation of specific monitoring.70 
For the moment, according to the case law, in essence, whether the host is liable will depend 
on its level of involvement. As can be seen from the different scenarios addressed and from 
the case law, there are different shades in this respect. All one can say is that, like the 
idea/expression dichotomy (the more detailed the idea is the more likely it is to be an 
expression), the more involved the host is, the more likely s/he will be liable under articles 8 
Rental and Lending Directive, 3 Infosoc Directive and 14 ECD. Right holders will be able to 
use injunctions for present and future infringements relating to a single or more repeat 
copyright infringers DFWLQJRQWKHFORXGFRPSXWLQJSURYLGHUKRVW¶VSODWIRUPBut stay-down 
injunctions are unlikely to be acceptable. In any case, many KRVWV¶WHUPVDOUHDG\SURYLGHIRU
suspension or termination RIDXVHU¶VDFFRXQWin case of repeat infringements. The problems 
with these suspensions and terminations are the danger of censorship and lack of a possibility 
of defence from the user (this happens of course only if the notice is not followed by a court 
order which has assessed the illegality of the content). Nevertheless, hosts need business and 
DUH XQOLNHO\ WR WHUPLQDWH XVHUV¶ DFFRXQWV LI WKH\ DUH QRW HQWLUHO\ FRQYLQFHG RI WKH
egregiousness of the infringement.  
In sum, the most important question for cloud computing providers is to determine the 
precise contours of their liability under the right of communication to the public and article 
14 ECD. Some of these contours have now emerged more cleDUO\DVDUHVXOWRIWKH&-(8¶V
case law even if partially. And more clarifications are already forthcoming from the CJEU 
and also in the form of legislation or soft law following the &RPPLVVLRQ¶VIXWXUHDFWLRQVLQ
response to the VWDNHKROGHUV¶decade of experience with the ECD.  
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